What Do Animals Care About?
Lilly-Marlene Russow
Purdue University

Editors' note: This paper by Professor
Russow, the response by Professor Stephens,
and the reply by Russow were presented at
the Pacific Division meetings of the Society
for the Study of Ethics and Animals, held
in San Francisco, California, March, 1995.

specify what "caring about" means, and why it is
important, and (c) in both ordinary usage and the
broader philosophical tradition captures a distinction
that is worth preserving.
R.G. Frey is perhaps the most familiar defender of
the position that animals cannot have desires. Although
he does not use terms like "care about," his conclusion
also entails that animals are incapable of caring about
things in the sense to be defmed below. His argument
can be summarized as follows:

pol. In order for S to desire 0, S must have some
beliefs about O.
P-2. Beliefs require the ability to entertain and
accept certain statements as true, and hence the
ability to draw a distinction between true and
false statements.
P-3. The ability to draw a distinction between true
and false statements requires the use of
language, and some understanding of how
language represents states of affairs.
P-4. Animals lack the requisite linguistic abilities.
C. Therefore, animals lack beliefs, desires, and
interests. 3

I am going to argue for a thesis that almost nobody in
this audience would dispute: animals have things they
care about, and the fact that animals care about them
has moral significance. However, the lack of
disagreement (in this forum, at least) should not disguise
the fact that more wode needs to be done, both to answer
a recent spate ofattempts to deny the thesis and to clarify
exactly what "caring about" means, covers, and entails
for our moral theories.
It might be more natural to talk about animals'
interests, rather than what they care about. Unfortunately, this term has been interpreted in so many
different ways that its use invites confusion. On one
end of the spectrum, Tom Regan wants to allow for
both preference and welfare interests, where the latter
can involve things about which the subject knows or
understands nothing.! On the other end, R.G. Frey
associates "interests" with terms such as "wants" and
"desires," and further argues that these states require
a language. 2 Rather than try to dictate which of these
interpretations more nearly reflects ordinary English
usage (a misguided prOject at best), I have chosen to
use a term which I hope (a) has less "baggage," at
least in the debate about animals, (b) will allow me to
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Although this argument is most closely associated
with Frey, it has been echoed by Michael Leahy. 4 Both
agree, for example, that Regan's broader use of
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unambiguous enougb terms.9 If we interpret the issue
this way, we migbt be tempted to respond: "we can't
tell, but the cat can, and that's wbat matters." This would
beg the question: the cbarge is not simply that we cannot
properly identify the object of the cat's desire, but that
it cannot have any desires without a language in wbicb
to express true and false propositions about that object.
The cbarge is that the cat lacks a medium in wbicb to
refer to or represent the object of any belief or desire,
and bence cannot bave beliefs and desires.
Contemporary pbilosopby provides a mucb more
effective response to this concern about the possibility
of baving an object of belief or desire. to The two salient
points for our purpose, in their most general form, are:
(1) any adequate psycbological theory that bopes to
explain animal bebavior will have to attribute to many
animals the ability to receive, encode, recall, and use
sucb information; 11 and (2) there is no reason to think
that the medium in whicb the mindlbrain encodes and
manipulates information is identical with the language
(if any) in wbicb one communicates. Hence, the lack
of a natural language of communication does not
provide good evidence against the bypothesis that a
being bas a language of tbougbt. And it is tbe
language of thougbt or something analogous to it,
not communication, tbat provides the basis for
propositional attitudes.
The first of these very general ideas drawn from
contemporary pbilosopby of mind is an essential part
of a more general demonstration of wby Bebaviorism
simply won't work. Bebaviorism simply bas not been
able to give an adequate theory wbicb explains the
bebavior of (at least) birds and mammals simply in terms
of stimulus response and positive and negative
reinforcements; either because the salient features for
explaining the feature may not be present in the
environment at the time, or because the feature is not
one wbicb can be captured in law-like statements about
the environment. 12 In marked contrast to the failures of
Bebaviorism, theories that work inevitably postulate that
complex creatures can carry with them and access
internally stored information about the world.
There are important disputes about the medium and
mecbanisms required to store and use information:
does it bave syntactic structure? bow holistic is it? etc.
(Even, in Dennett's case: in wbat sense is it real?). The
relevant point of agreement for our purposes is that the
medium cannot be limited to natural languages such
as Englisb. To do so (a) threatens to lead to an infinite

"interest" cannot be sufficient to establisb moral
relevance, since Regan's concept of interests would,
according to them, entails that tractors as well as can
bave "interests" in that sense.
Many animal scientists also reject talk of animals'
interests or desires or caring, usually preferring terms
sucb as "needs" wbicb seem to them more quantifiable
and testable, bence more scientifically respectable. A
full defense of my appeal to a concept of "caring about"
sbould address the scientific claim; also Carruthers's
arguments on this subject, and would explore some
reasons wby Daniel Dennett's recent account of
consciousness5 poses a very similar threat to talk. of
animals' interests and caring. Althougb there will not
be time to do justice to these themes today, they do
indicate the range of serious cballenges to the idea that
animals do have interests and care about things.
As I have already acknowledged, terms like
"interests" have a rather messy bistory, even within
the narrow confines of debates about animals. Very
roughly, with many intermediate possibilities left
aside, the two opposing interpretations of "S bas an
interest in 0'>6 would be:
(1) "S [rationally?] desires 0," or

(2) "0 would enhance S's ability to fulfill its proper
function, role, or telos."
Sense (1) is the one that leads Frey, Carruthers,
and Leahy to reject the claim that animals can bave
full-blown morally weighty interests. Again acknowledging the oversimplification, it would seem that for
all three, S's desiring 0 entails (a) that there is a way
of specifying, fixing, or correctly identifying the
object of S's desire, and (b) that S bas the capacity
to identify 0 and distinguisb it from things that would
not satisfy the desire.
Tbe perbaps surprising link with Dennett comes
primarily througb condition (a), with (b) providing a
secondary connection. Althougb Deooett is generally
considered a supporter of cognitive ethology and its
references to the intentional mental states of animals,?
his more recent championing of "beteropbenomonology"
gives a special role to language in fIXing the appropriate
ascription of intentional states. 8
A tempting, but probably misguided, response to
this argument is to treat it as a variant on the problem
of other minds: we can never get to the truth of what
the cat wants, because tbe cat can't tell us in
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necessary and sufficient conditions was well buried with
logical positivism; although we sometimes can and
ought to offer such conditions, they· are not always
necessary for knowledge or respectable science. The
undeniable fact is that experienced observers can tell
quite well when an animal is happy.
On the one hand, books about dog training,
horseback riding, animal husbandry of all sorts, are
filled with statements like: any good dog owner
(dairyman, rider, etc.) can tell whether an animal is
happy, fearful, bored, or irritated. On the other hand, at
some point in almost any discussion of the treatment
of fann or laboratory animal, someone inevitably raises
the challenge: "But you can't really give us hard
scientific data about how to tell whether an animal is
happy, can you?" This challenge may be followed with
the assertion that it is therefore wrong to demand that
we act as if a severely confined animal is unhappy
(since we don't know for sure that he is), or even the
charge that one is committing the eighth deadly sin:
anthropomorphism.
The answer to this challenge lies in some fairly
straightforward epistemology. On the assumption that
we can set aside extreme skepticism (which would mean
we would have to doubt not only the mental life but the
physical existence of the sow and her crate, as well as
the mental lives offellow humans), there are two widely
recognized reliable indications that we know what we
are talking about, and that we are describing something
real about the world.
The frrst way to convince you that I know what I'm
talking about, that I'm saying something true, is to
describe to you a general scientific theory and
methodology that allows us to explain, predict, and
understand in a fairly deep way, what is going on. If
you ask me why stones roll downhill, and I glibly assure
you that "it's because of gravity," you probably should
probe to see whether I can back up my assertion in this
sort of way. You might find out that I know no more
about gravity than a nineteenth century biologist who
blithely tells us that we move because of our elan vital.
This, of course, is the ultimate aim of science. We want
to know not only what happens, but why it happens. As
a result of a better understanding of why things happen,
I often also get better at predicting and identifying what
happens: as a result of understanding. In the case of
happiness, this approach does not look very promising.
However, we often do remarkably well even in the
absence of such deep explanatory theories, and we do

regress of interpretations of linguistic signs, (b)
overlooks the fact that a very large portion of cognitive
psychology works as well for animals that lack a natural
language (small humans as well as nonhumans) as it
does for adult language users, and (c) founders on the
question of how we can learn a language without the
prior ability to form hypotheses. Moreover, the inner
representations in this medium, whatever it is, can be
accurate or inaccurate, true or false, thus answering
another of Frey's concerns.
If the foregoing argument is correct, we have
explained how a being can have beliefs and desires
without having a language with which to communicate
descriptions about the objects ofthose inner states. Thus,
many animals can have beliefs and desires, and satisfy
the conditions set forth for having interests in amorally
relevant sense. 13 Moreover, tractors don't have these
sorts of inner states, and neither do paramecia. 14
However, we are not out of the woods yet: although
tractors and paramecia don't have desires (because they
don't have mental representations), computers might
well, and it would certainly disturb our reflective
equilibrium to fmd our moral theory generating direct
duties to our PC's.
This is where "caring about" becomes relevant. At
least none of the current crop of artificial life cares about
whether it gets what it wants. 1S I wish to claim that we
can identify a sense of "caring about" such that many
animals typically do care about getting what they desire,
but (at least the current generation of) computers do
not. In order to justify that claim, we will have to unpack
the notion of caring.
I propose to do this via an indirect approach: by
asking if/how we might be justified in saying that one
animal is happier or more contented than another. If
animal scientists read this paper, they will certainly
either cringe or fume at the sloppy, untestable
language, but that is exactly why I chose these terms.
Despite their lack of direct physiological or behavioral
correlates or indicators (or "operant definitions"),
terms like "happy" and "content" do have a justifiable
place in the scientific study of animals, and they also
provide a clearer foundation for investigating what
animals care about.
The first thing any self-respecting animal scientist
would do at this point is to ask what I mean by "happy,"
trying to raise the suspicion that there is no real state to
be relied on here. The frrst thing any self-respecting
philosopher would respond is that the demand for
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claims, and given that we have such a situation with
reports about whether animals are happy, content, upset,
etc., I conclude that we are justified in accepting those
reports as descriptions of animals' actual states. Having
done so, we are ready to return to the topic ofcaring about.
Having argued that we can talk about an animal's
being happy or unhappy, and make reliable judgments
about such states, I now propose to define what Scares
about in terms of what makes S happy (or less unhappy)
in the following manner:

so without lapsing into "subjectivity." All of us, to some
extent, and some of us to an astounding extent, can
recognize features of the world without being able to
spell out in any detailed way how we do so. Here are
some examples: 16
(1) Chicken sexers.
(2) SAT evaluators and others who grade "standardized" essay exams.
(3) Chess players who recognize significantpatterns.
(4) Any competent English speaker judging the
grammaticality of sentences.

S cares about 0 if S directly desires 0,17 and getting
or achieving 0 contributes to S's happiness.

The objectivity in such cases is established in two
ways. First, predictive success: the success rate of the
chicken sexer can be determined quite easily, and good
pattern recognizers will win more chess games. Second,
where the observers are in fact picking out something
that is really there, we find a high degree of intersubjective agreement, at least among skilled, trained,
experienced practitioners. These two features provide
good epistemic warrant for believing that observers are
accurately detecting an objective feature of the world,
something that is really "out there." Both features can
often be found in judgments about an animal's
emotional and mental states.
Predictive success in judging an animal's inner
states, including happiness, comes down to whether we
can interact as we want to with animals: they do what
we want, don't attack us, settle down calmly, thrive
without developing "vices," and so on. That's why
books on dog training and horseback riding are so filled
with talk about the need to recognize when an animals
is happy or contented. Learning to recognize these states
increases one's success at working well with the animal.
Intersubjective agreement (assuming objective,
knowledgeable observers) is less obvious in the case
of animal happiness because heavily influenced by
preconceptions and the fact that we have been taught
to talk about animals in more "rigorous" and "scientific"
ways. However, if we focus on people who work and
live with animals, the intersubjective agreement soon
becomes apparent. Good dog handlers will usually agree
about whether a dog is enjoying herself; two shepherds
will pick out the same ewe as the one who is
uncomfortable; and so on.
Given that reports by observers with a high degree
ofpredictive success and intersubjective agreement are
perfectly respectable sources of objective knowledge

Summer & Fall 1995

This definition entails that getting (or being denied)
what she cares about makes a difference to the general
state of S's experienced well-being. It also allows for
varying intensity of caring: some things will matter
more than others. Finally, this definition entails that we
can be mistaken about what we care about we can think
we care about something, only to discover that we were
wrong: when we achieve it, we discover that it does
not make us happy. These features combine to delineate
a real phenomenon in many humans and many animals.
The resulting definition accords well with our ordinary
concept of caring about, and helps explain why the
objects of caring carry moral significance in a way that
more neutral interests may not.
Let me emphasize that I am not claiming that we
care about things because they contribute to our
happiness; we may sometimes do so, but we may have
all sorts of other reasons for caring about something.
Rather, I am suggesting that a hallmark, a definitive
criterion of what we care about (as opposed to what we
think we care about) is that it contributes to our
happiness or alleviates our unhappiness.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to
offer a complete axiology and to locate "what we care
about" in that framework. However, at the very least,
the sort of interests highlighted in this new vocabulary
of "caring about" carry more prima facie moral weight
than things that are merely "good for" some being. If
one is a preference utilitarian, for example, caring about
is a more obvious manifestation of preference than
interests in any weaker sense. From a deontological
perspective, paying due attention to what a being cares
about seems an appropriate way of respecting the
individual as a source of valuing, without reducing him!
her to a mere contributor to the general good. In any
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event the values highlighted by what we care about will
be hard to ignore in an adequate moral theory.
In this paper, I have argued for two theses. The ftrst
is that arguments such as Frey's and Leahy's fail to
establish that animals do not have interests in a morally
relevant sense. The second is that we can identify the
relevant sense of interests, and at least begin to illustrate
its moral relevance, by focusing on the question of what
animals care about. There is much more to be said on
this topic, of course. The critical side of my argument
must be extended to respond more specifically to other
skeptics, such as Davidson and Carruthers, and potential
skeptics such as Dennett. More work also remains to
be done to establish the exact role in our moral theory
of what beings care about. However, we have made
signiftcant progress in both these directions.

9 I say "probably" for two reasons. First, this may be
what some nonphilosophers are worried about. Second, at
least in discussion, some of Frey's responses seem to move
in this direction.
10 Although I will present the view in terminology most
closely associated with Jerry Fodor's "language of thought,"
nothing in what I say here implies a commitment to Fodor's
rejection of connectionism. Any theory which posits a method
of encoding or representing information about the environment, including non-eliminativist versions of connectionism,
will support the same conclusion. The two reasons presented
in the text are purposely presented as claims that would be
accepted by almost any plausible non-eliminativist account
of cognitive states.

11 To forestall the inevitable "how far down do you go?"
reply, let me point out that these systems can vary in
complexity, ranging from highly abstract and complex to so
simple as to no longer count as a "language of thought." For
more details, see Jerry Fodor, ''Why Paramecia Don't Have
Mental Representations." Midwest Studies in Philosophy, v.
X: Philosophy of Mind. French and Uehling (eds),
Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1986, pp. 3-23.
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